Main trends

Since Bulgaria’s accession to the EU, the country’s development policy activities have evolved significantly. They include the adoption of acts of secondary legislation, but also capacity building in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is the principal driver of development policy formulation and implementation. It has approved a series of Medium Term Programmes to meet various commitments EU and UN commitments. In addition, Bulgaria is starting to deploy development policy on a bilateral basis in sectors such as healthcare, quality education, good governance and civil society participation, secure work and economic growth.

In 2011, Bulgarian development aid was 0.09% of GNI, reached its peak in 2022 (0.27%), and in 2024 it was 0.14%. For 2024, this amounts to EUR 123.43 million. And although a large part of these funds passes through multilateral channels (EU, UN), the share of bilateral funds is growing.

Compared to 2011, bilateral funding in 2024, is characterised by geographical and thematic diversity. In addition to the traditional countries of the Western Balkans and the Black Sea region, development aid also includes countries in Southeast and Central Asia, a number of Arab and sub-Saharan African countries.

Government’s relationship with civil society

The relations between CSOs in Bulgaria and the relevant officials responsible for the planning and implementation of development policy has also evolved. It is worth noting, for example, that in 2015 a 2-year cooperation agreement was signed between the BPID and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After that, BPID actively participated in various working groups and participated in consultations on various key development policy documents.

As officials in the directorates and departments dealing with development policy are diplomats, they are often assigned to missions abroad, which can entail restarting the partnership process. However, as diplomats contribute to policy development in their new positions, this can enhance support for CSOs working locally in partner countries

Main trends

There are many downward trends in Sweden’s development assistance: decreasing ODA levels overall, decreasing resources for people in the most marginalised countries, decreasing gender equality spending, among others. For now, Sweden remains one of the few countries still above the 0.7% of GNI for international aid, but on the current trajectory Sweden will fail to meet that commitment in two to three years. Except for the strong support for Ukraine, the only policy areas where both political energy and aid budgets have been consistently committed are in areas unrelated to development goals: migration control and export promotion.

In 2022, we welcomed an 8% cap imposed on in-donor country refugee costs in ODA, although such costs in Sweden should not be taken from the aid budget at all. However, in 2025 and onwards these costs have been artificially inflated, even though there are fewer people in the asylum system.

For decades, Sweden has been internationally recognised as a principled donor, the first country in the world to adopt a feminist foreign policy, a major contributor of multilateral core funding, and a big supporter of civil society, democracy, human rights and gender equality, even when these issues face resistance. The current government has expressed continued support for similar priorities, but resource allocations lag behind. Climate financing increased but is being drawn from a shrinking aid budget. Sweden is both following and co-creating the trend seen elsewhere in the EU, with a strong Europe-first and export promotion-driven logic.

Government’s relationship with civil society

In many cases, Sweden contributes to positive change in multilateral negotiations and partnerships at country level and worldwide. In the last decades, Sweden could be described as a dialogue-oriented partner. However, in recent years there has been increased politicisation of decisions about the development budget. In 2025, there has been parliamentary scrutiny of the government to discuss if undue political influencing of Sida has occurred on specific grants and processes outside the remits of political decisions.

The current government has made changes to the financing model for civil society, leading to contracts being terminated without valid grounds and severely impacting many organisations’ financial conditions by changes in grant volumes, funding and co-funding requirements, without prior analysis of the consequences. In parallel, there was deteriorating dialogue and an absence of consultation processes with civil society organisations. Changing funding criteria and rules late in the selection process has further impaired transparency, fairness and efficient use of time, commitment and resources.

Main trends

Spain is undergoing a slow and gradual recovery of ODA following the collapse of Spanish cooperation in the last decade, when it fell from 0.46% (2009) to 0.15% (2012) and its institutional framework was profoundly weakened, especially at national level. 

The Law on Cooperation for Development and Global Solidarity approved in 2023 by a large majority of parliamentary groups sets a commitment to reach at least 0.7% by 2030. This majority approval recognises the policy of cooperation as a matter of state policy. The Spanish government’s public statements insist on this in international fora and express a necessary commitment to multilateralism and development cooperation policy, as well as to the values that underpin it. Recently the government announced the Plan Sevilla that reaffirms that commitment. The main political groups, except for the far-right, are also aligned with the development of the Cooperation Law and its financing commitments. 

However, Spanish ODA has been stagnant since 2023 at around 0.25% of its GNI and the outlook for 2025 and 2026 is unlikely to reverse this trend significantly if extraordinary budgetary contributions are not applied.

There is therefore a significant distance between commitments and fulfilment in the quantitative sphere, only partly explained by the parliamentary minority that the government has in the Congress of Deputies, which is not allowing the approval of the General State Budget from 2023.

Government’s relationship with civil society

A positive relationship and a regular and constructive dialogue are maintained to advance in the development of the Cooperation Law at its different levels, both bilaterally and in the different consultative spaces of which La Coordinadora is a part, such as the Cooperation Council.

Since 2024, this dialogue has also included topics such as the Fourth Conference on International Financing for Development and frequent consultations on the different sectoral strategies under formulation. The dialogue on the critical situation of human rights violations in Palestine, especially in the Gaza Strip, has also been intense and constructive both with the government and with the different parliamentary groups, which approved in 2024 a non-legislative proposal in Congress that includes different demands from organised civil society.

Concerns have been shared with the government about the closure of civic space and the difficulties for the work of organisations in different countries, as well as about the dangerous tendency of the EU to limit the political advocacy actions of organisations. Steps have also been taken in the formalisation of the Relationship Framework between the Development NGOs, represented by the Coordinator and the General State Administration.

Main trends

In January 2025, the Slovenian CSO’s initiative Voice of the People presented its third report on the coalition government’s fulfilment of 122 commitments made by coalition parties during the 2022 election campaign. According to the report, the government had fulfilled or partially fulfilled only 27 commitments. The coalition’s promise to raise Official Development Assistance has been completely broken as Slovenian ODA was cut in 2023 and 2024. Furthermore, according to the OECD DAC report, the government plans to cut ODA even more in the following years while simultaneously raising the defence budget to up to 5% of Slovenian GNI.

Slovenian ODA is still too much focused on Europe (former Yugoslavia republics, Ukraine), while Latin America and Asia are completely excluded as target regions, while there are also plans to greatly reduce the number of African countries for international development cooperation. There are not enough funds for Slovenian CSOs’ projects in the Global South, LDCs and Palestine.

Government’s relationship with civil society

While it is true that there was more money for CSOs in the international development call by the MFA, civil society in general is not satisfied with the government’s work. On 14 February 2025, the civil initiative Voice of the People staged a protest against the ruling coalition calling on the government to fulfil their promises. There is currently a campaign launched to initiate a referendum on the government’s plan to significantly raise defence spending. More defence spending means less money for CSOs in Slovenia.

Main trends

Slovakia is shifting away from an initial outlook based more on solidarity and transformation and towards a more pragmatic donor approach with a strong emphasis on economic diplomacy. Despite the 20th anniversary of Slovakia as a donor country and 10 years of DAC OECD membership, ODA remained critically underfunded at just 0.14% of GNI (EUR 182 million)–far below the international commitment of 0.33% by 2030. At the same time it has shown no appetite for bilateral aid budget increase. The entire system is also quite outdated with no major systemic changes be it in the area of instruments, strategy, approach or modus operandi. The world has changed profoundly with some major crises having a direct impact on Slovakia, but the system of the Slovak ODA did not change.

In 2024, Slovakia’s ODA system faced unprecedented pressure from a rapidly evolving geopolitical and humanitarian environment as well as domestic fiscal consolidation measures. The real value of Slovak aid continued to decline due to inflation, and the main grant budget for bilateral projects (SAIDC) was cut in the middle of year by nearly 70%, severely limiting the country’s ability to respond to global crises and undermining its credibility as a development partner.

Bilateral ODA accounted for only 27% of total ODA, while 73% was channelled through multilateral contributions. The system remained fragmented and unpredictable, with no new mechanisms for rapid humanitarian response introduced. Despite the third draft of the National Strategy for Global Education being introduced, it was not adopted.

Government’s relationship with civil society

The relationship between civil society and governmental stakeholders in Slovakia in 2024 became significantly more challenging. While dialogue and consultation channels with MFA technically remained open, the general environment for NGOs–including Ambrela members–deteriorated due to several government measures. In addition to the nearly 70% reduction of SAIDC grants for development projects, the government introduced or proposed restrictive policies such as a foreign agent law, a transactional tax or institutional changes at numerous ministries. It curbed public funding to NGOs, limited participatory processes in legislative processes and increased administrative controls; audits also further contributed to a climate of uncertainty and pressure. Compared to previous years, when cooperation was more predictable, these developments have made long-term planning and partnership for civil society actors considerably more difficult.

Main trends

Over the past 20 years, Portuguese ODA has experienced progress and setbacks, marked by both international commitments and internal limitations. Before the 2011 financial crisis, Portugal strengthened its role as a donor, focusing on Portuguese-speaking African countries (PALOP) and Timor-Leste. Part of the high figures during this period resulted from the accounting of debt forgiveness as ODA, a common practice at the time. However, the economic crisis led to an abrupt decline in aid from 2011–2012, when the cooperation budget faced severe cuts.

Between 2016 and 2021, Portuguese ODA saw a modest recovery in absolute terms. However, the increase GNI during this period was not matched by a proportional aid rise, resulting in a stagnant ODA/GNI ratio. In 2021, the ratio remained below 0.2%, placing Portugal among the EU donors with the lowest relative effort. From 2022, ODA increased again, reaching EUR 619 million in 2024 (0.24% of GNI), but largely due to refugee-related spending following the invasion of Ukraine invasion and not for structural cooperation improvements.

Since 2015, multilateral aid has dominated, due to growing commitments to international organisations and a decline in bilateral aid managed directly by Portugal.

Despite progress to engage civil society – including the recent strengthening of co-financing grant lines managed by Camões, I.P. – the fragmentation of Portuguese cooperation, the low level of direct execution by the coordinating agency (less than 7% of ODA between 2018–2020), and the absence of binding commitments to the 0.7% GNI target, continue to limit its reach and predictability.

In 2024, preliminary OECD data show that Portugal recorded an increase in its ODA. However, much of this growth resulted from increased multilateral contributions, while bilateral aid declined. Well-structured bilateral cooperation aligned with partner countries’ priorities has a direct and transformative impact, and must be improved.

In the coming years, Portugal must align its cooperation with the principles of policy coherence for development and aid effectiveness, strengthening the focus on human development, reducing inequalities, and promoting ownership by partner countries, as outlined in the Portuguese Cooperation Strategy 2030.

Government’s relationship with civil society

Plataforma acknowledges the openness to dialogue shown by key actors within Portuguese development cooperation, including the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation, as well as the national development agency, Camões I.P. In particular, the dialogue with Camões I.P. is not only open but also meaningful and impactful, often leading to tangible outcomes not only for Plataforma’s member organisations, but for NGDOs in general.

The 2024 funding for NGO projects remained at comparable levels in 2025. Nevertheless, there is still potential to enhance the support mechanisms for NGO work. Plataforma is concerned by the fact that the Development Cooperation Forum was not convened at all in 2024 (with the last one being held in September 2023). The Development Cooperation Forum is a consultation body with a crucial role in ensuring effective coordination between public institutions and the diverse stakeholders–particularly NGOs–who contribute to the objectives of Portugal’s development policy.

Main trends

Total spending on development cooperation in 2024 was almost EUR 1.93 billion (PLN 8.2 billion or 0.24% GNI compared with 0.33% GNI commitment), decreasing roughly by a quarter mainly due to lower IDRC costs. Less than EUR 352 million (PLN 1.5 billion or approximately 18% of total ODA for 2024) was allocated to refugees (mainly from Ukraine). Bilateral aid to Ukraine amounted to EUR 188 million (PLN 0.8 billion).

Multilateral ODA together with IDRC and students’ costs serve for around 80% of total ODA leaving a small share –10% of bilateral ODA– for project-based activities in partner countries. Even less, only about 1.8% of bilateral ODA, is allocated to projects through Polish CSOs and none (!) for developing country-based CSOs.

The first full year of the new government (formed in December 2023) did not bring any significant changes in the area of development cooperation. For another year in a row, no strategy was developed to increase PL ODA to partner countries. The future of PL ODA in following years will mostly be determined by external factors, such as the war in Ukraine, negotiations on the next EU MFF and the USA rejecting the current model of FFSD. Internally it is as much about political ideology (with increasing anti-migrant, inward-looking nationalist rhetoric) as about projected budgetary constraints for 2026 and beyond.

Government’s relationship with civil society

The new government stressed Polish responsibility for tackling global challenges through ODA and declared its intention to improve cooperation with CSOs. At present, declarations have not been backed up by real action. The participation of CSOs in PL ODA as project implementers has remained at a very low level. New grant competitions aimed at non-governmental organisations were cancelled in 2024 due to the budgetary situation. Ongoing cooperation takes place, inter alia, through the participation of CSO representatives in meetings of the Development Cooperation Policy Council. The key recommendations of the non-governmental sector from previous years, consistent with the recommendations of the OECD DAC from the 2023 Peer Review of Polish Development Cooperation, remain in force.

Main trends

In 2024, the Netherlands underwent a radical shift in its ODA approach. The radical-right minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation publicly favoured cutting all ODA, while the finance minister broke the Dutch 50-year commitment to the 0.7% of GDP pledge. This will reduce ODA from 0.62% of GDP in 2024 to 0.44% from 2026 onward, abandoning the ambition to reach 0.7%. A target that was only achieved once in the last 20 years. However, the government also implemented a positive change by capping In-Donor Refugee Costs at 10%. Over the past 23 years, IDRC exceeded budget estimates in 21 years, causing significant cuts to international ODA allocations. With IDRC representing 18.9% of total ODA in 2024 and estimated to exceed 25% in 2025, this cap provides much-needed predictability.

Thematically, there has also been a shift in policy. Projects focused on gender equality and climate were defunded, with policy refocusing on food security, water and health. The underlying priorities have become peace and security, reducing migration, and increasing international trade. This is an ODA narrative that emphasises Dutch national interests.

Additionally, a result of this narrower focus excludes most fragile contexts. The government prioritises areas where aid and trade policies can work well together, despite critical evaluations showing this approach is inefficient and lacks long-term sustainable development impact. The current policy intends to intensify private sector involvement in development policies. This represents a move away from sustainable development toward instrumentalising ODA for national interests. The narrow thematic scope directly contradicts the department’s stated ambitions to transition toward more locally led development approaches.

Government’s relationship with civil society

CSOs have long been Dutch Government partners, but 2024 introduced significant strain to this relationship. The thematic shift challenged existing partnerships, while the minister publicly expressed mistrust in CSOs and persistently attempted to defund national and international advocacy. Her narrative consistently argued that CSOs should rely on societal rather than government support, despite advice from the Advisory Board on International Policy (AIV) that supporting these organisations is essential for democratic systems. Limited civic space has become an increasing concern in the Netherlands.

Political unrest delayed implementation of new CSO financing instruments, likely creating a worrisome gap in funding of up to 6 months that could result in valuable knowledge and network losses by 2027. There is also a stark contrast in CSO involvement in developing new instruments, which used to entail extensive consultation, as there has been markedly less space for dialogue this year.

In 2024 the government also announced a 50% threshold for government financing of CSOs requiring organisations to source half their funding from non-institutional sources. This policy creates significant uncertainty for Dutch organisations, as implementation details remain unclear.

Main trends

Malta support for SIDS in international political fora, as well as by providing technical expertise in relevant areas such as water management in islands, is of particular importance and utility, given the inherent water scarcity related to small islands. It is a good example of how to use the experience gained by Malta in developing solutions to minimise water wastage and strengthen water security.

Another initiative in support of SIDS is the collaboration with the Islands and Small States Institute at the University of Malta, and the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) in developing a Climate Vulnerability and Resilience Index (CVRI). The CRVI aims to measure exposure to adverse economic shocks across different countries. It is guided by the principles of the Barbados Programme and the SAMOA Pathway, and builds on the UN Multidimensional Vulnerability Index (UNGA Res 75/215). The CVRI introduces a tool with global applicability to support policy measures to address the challenges, and opportunities, brought by climate change, enabling all countries to identify the specific features that expose them to its impact and to adopt measures to increase their resilience. The results of the CVRI can inform International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and donors in the allocation of related concessional funding.

For 2025, Malta is set to place a stronger emphasis on digital health (digital telemedicine and health workforce skills) and on education (particularly foundational learning, digital skills and girls’ education). Malta has recently applied for membership to the International Forum on Total Official Support for Sustainable Development (TOSSD).

Government’s relationship with civil society

Communication with civil society is still unstructured with limited opportunity for dialogue and consultation. The annual call for projects implemented in ODA-eligible countries submitted by Maltese NGDOs was once again issued in 2024 after an absence of 4 years, with three micro-grants being approved. The 2025 call was issued with an increase in the grant allocation as well as some improved conditions and a widened thematic and geographic scope when compared with previous calls.

Main trends

In 2024, Luxembourg maintained its commitment to ODA of 1% of GNI while honouring the principle of additionality which calculates international climate and refugee-related costs outside of ODA. The government announced its intention to discontinue bilateral cooperation agreements with three of its six privileged cooperation partner countries due to concerns with the rule of law following military coups in Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali. However, Luxembourg’s international cooperation maintained its support to civil society actors and multilateral actors in these countries.

Negotiations initiated in 2024 with the goal of reforming the financing arrangements for global citizenship education by NGOs within Luxembourg lead to strong uncertainty about the future direction of Luxembourg’s international cooperation in general, and of NGOs capacity to offer GCE in particular. While the preliminary results of these negotiations signalled a strong and sustained commitment to GCE towards the end of 2024, new financing remained suspended and budgetary pressures created through the evolving geopolitical and fiscal environment (e.g. increased military budgets) created further uncertainties around the long-term commitments of the reform plans which have yet to be fully implemented.

In this context, reluctance by the Luxembourgish government to commit to a stable multiannual ODA budget projection or to the future of additionality marked an important departure from previous practice and added to the perceived instability in terms of financing and planning for NGOs.

Luxembourg continued strengthening its support of multilateral institutions in 2024, including UNRWA and other humanitarian actors. The country underwent an OECD DAC peer review in the process of which it underlined its intention to further expand implementation of a “whole-of-government” approach in its bilateral partnerships.

Government’s relationship with civil society

In 2024, the relationship between civil society and the government in Luxembourg was strained by the latter’s decision to question public financial support for CSOs critical of the government following a fraud-related bankruptcy of a major NGO, as well as its decision to impose further administrative requirements on CSOs through a reform of the law on CSO governance. Simultaneously, various planned legal reforms were initiated that would lead to a shrinking of civic space (most notably laws regulating demonstrations). Despite this general trend, NGOs maintained a good professional relationship with their governing ministries and continued to be involved in regular consultations of cooperation stakeholders. While institutionalised cooperation between the government and CSOs continued in 2024, public questioning of the quality and overall utility of CSOs by members of government and affiliated policy makers marked a turn from a historically strongly consensus-oriented political culture in Luxembourg.

Main trends

In 2024, Lithuania’s ODA, which includes government-funded aid and humanitarian assistance to developing countries, reached EUR 179 million, or 0.24% of GNI. This is a decrease from the peak of EUR 231.31 million (0.36% of GNI) achieved in 2022. The main reason for the decrease was a reduction in expenses for refugees, which are counted as ODA only during their first year in the host country. In 2024, Lithuania allocated EUR 85 million to bilateral aid and EUR 94 million to multilateral aid. The largest recipient of Lithuania’s bilateral assistance was Ukraine, which received EUR 52.15 million. A total of EUR 22.56 million from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ budget was allocated for development cooperation activities.

Bilateral Cooperation and Key Projects.

In 2024, Lithuania launched 47 new bilateral projects and continued 21 previously initiated ones. These projects were implemented through the Development Cooperation and Democracy Promotion Programme and the Fund. The Fund allocated EUR 16.2 million to 22 projects, with EUR 15.2 million dedicated to reconstruction efforts in Ukraine. It also approved Guidelines for Lithuania’s Engagement in Ukraine’s Reconstruction and Recovery 2024–2027, signalling sustained Ukraine-focused programming. Other countries receiving funding included Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Palestine and Kenya. Lithuania also supported Belarusian civil society and continued its national co-financing for the European Commission’s EU4Youth programme.

Over the past two decades, Lithuania has established itself as a donor country; however, achievement of the longstanding commitment to allocate 0.33% of GNI to development cooperation by 2030 remains unlikely, and substantive global development education and effective NGDO engagement are constrained by insufficient funding. Development cooperation policy continues to receive minimal political, media and public attention, with limited parliamentary oversight and negligible visibility in national reporting.

Government’s relationship with civil society

The government maintains a formally structured and increasingly strategic relationship with CSOs. The Lithuanian NGDO Platform plays a central role in coordinating and guiding civil society actors engaged in development cooperation. This includes working with the MFA on the annual Development Cooperation Conference and facilitating dialogue on development cooperation with newly elected members of Parliament. The Ministry of Social Security and Labour continues to support the Lithuanian NGDO Platform with the Network on Humanitarian Action, in partnership with Vilnius University, to implement annual humanitarian training to strengthen CSO capacity. CSOs are also represented in consultative bodies, including the Inter-institutional Commission on Development Cooperation, the Lithuanian Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid Foundation council, the NGO council, etc.

Despite progress, NGOs face challenges such as complex administrative requirements, a lack of co-funding for nationally funded projects and financial mechanisms to guarantee cash flow for internationally funded projects, struggles to find reliable partners in partner countries, and competition for limited funding from both NGOs and public institutions. Streamlined procedures and enhanced collaboration are essential to strengthen their role in development cooperation.

Main trends

In 2024, Latvia made a major development by officially applying to join the DAC, setting the stage for its membership in 2025. The commitment raises hopes that Latvia will maintain its ODA as a percentage of GNI above pre-Ukraine war levels and move closer to the 0.7% international target. Although overall ODA declined compared to the previous year, primarily due to reduced expenditure for Ukrainian refugees and the absence of vaccine donations reported in 2023, support to Ukraine increased as a share of total aid, reflecting continued solidarity and commitment to addressing war impacts and supporting EU integration.

Although bilateral ODA has remained stable and recent commitments are positive, there is room for improvement in aid delivery and priority alignment. Only a small share of grant funding reaches partner countries, as projects remain largely led by Latvian implementers with limited local actor involvement, falling short of the localisation principle of shifting power to in-country stakeholders.

Historically focused on Eastern Partnership and Central Asia, Latvia expanded its bilateral development cooperation more prominently into Africa in 2024. It implemented eight projects in countries such as Ethiopia, Namibia and Rwanda, with a strong focus on delivery through civil society, targeting women’s economic participation, digital skills, and entrepreneurship. Although LDCs are defined as a priority, limited engagement and a broad regional focus raise doubts about their effectiveness and pose challenges for impact assessment due to the varying development contexts.

Bilateral, open-call project evaluation significantly improved with the introduction of more transparent and results-oriented criteria. However, further improvement is needed by aligning project application and evaluation criteria with horizontal priorities and a focused subset of priority SDGs, as the current approach spans too many goals.

Government’s relationship with civil society

Over the past 20 years, the relationship with governmental stakeholders has evolved from sporadic engagement to a more structured and value-oriented partnership, with greater recognition of civil society’s role in shaping development policy. The positive shift is reflected in the allocation of 50% of bilateral project financing to civil society implementers.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also participates in sectoral events as well as supporting communication campaigns and educational events by CSOs, including the Global Education Week, which has been held for 12 years, organised in partnership with the Latvian Platform for Development Cooperation (LAPAS). Furthermore, LAPAS active involvement in the Foreign Policy Experts Council and the Development Cooperation Advisory Council, as well as discussions on the annual foreign policy report, demonstrates a welcome space for civil society input and constructive dialogue between parties.

Main trends

Over the past 20 years, Italy’s international development cooperation has shown some steady features alongside significant changes. Italy’s ODA has persistently remained low relative to GNI, fluctuating between 0.14% and 0.33%, confirming its image as financially low-intensity cooperation. Between 2005 and 2023, ODA relied heavily on international channels (57% multilateral, 37% via the EU) and was almost entirely grant-based (95%). Over the same period of time, debt relief and in-donor refugee costs together averaged 22% of total ODA, while CSO funding rose in 2023 constant prices from EUR 83 million in 2005 to EUR 142 million in 2023.

In 2014, a reform replaced the 1987 framework, modernising Italy’s development cooperation. As noted in Aid Watch reports, it established three pillars – MAECI, the Italian Agency (AICS – launched 2016), and CDP (the financial arm) – and introduced multi-year budget planning and projections and structured consultation via the National Council. However, governments have failed to address the core issue: aligning ODA levels with the 0.7% global commitment.

At present, Italy stands out for avoiding ODA cuts, unlike many donors– though starting from a relatively low baseline. Since 2022, a defining feature has been the strong political leadership of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who unveiled the Piano Mattei per l’Africa. Coming from a political tradition of the Italian right, the initiative is striking for its language, emphasising a new kind of partnership with African countries and recognising Africa’s strategic importance. The plan reflects the increasingly popular notion of transactional aid, where development cooperation is closely tied to the pursuit of reciprocal political and economic gains.

Government’s relationship with civil society

Relationships with institutions are stable and, in some areas, improving. CSOs have maintained leadership roles in the working groups of the National Council for Development Cooperation, generating inputs on policies including the multi-year planning process, development effectiveness, policy coherence, and evaluation. Dialogue between CSOs and the institutions of Italy’s international cooperation system takes place at multiple levels, covering both structural issues – such as improving procedures – and emergency responses. It would be highly beneficial to further systematise these relationships, making them more reliable and consistent over time. Funding for CSO-led initiatives has recently increased, even though these organisations had also been under significant political pressure in the past, particularly with respect to their role in migration-related activities.

Main trends

Since 2015, Ireland has maintained a consistent level of ODA spending, leading to its non-inflated ODA spending averaging 0.32% of GNI. This translated to significant increases in spending volumes due to a positive economic climate. Spending peaked in 2023 when global ODA reached 0.67% of GNI. However, OECD DAC preliminary figures for 2024 indicate a drop of 14% in ODA spending, with Ireland’s spending of EUR 2.10 billion representing 0.57% of GNI. In light of an uncertain economic and trading environment, Ireland has reiterated its commitment to maintain current levels of ODA spending but has not as yet indicated any increases for 2025.

Climate finance, while being of good quality and primarily grant-based, continues to be counted as non-additional ODA, which is an issue that should be rectified, particularly as Ireland’s required contribution to global climate finance will likely increase following a revised global finance target agreed at COP29. Ireland is increasingly directing funding to multilateral organisations. Although CSOs have received more funding over the years, their share of ODA as a percentage of GNI has steadily declined.

Government’s relationship with civil society

Irish civil society enjoys a positive relationship with the Irish Government. This is underpinned by shared values and a commitment to provide effective, untied and impactful development assistance to reach those left furthest behind. Government and legislative bodies are open to dialogue at both the informal and formal level, and civil society is considered a key partner in attaining commonly-held objectives, a source of critical information and knowledge, as well as key in programme implementation. The relationship was enhanced through the establishment in recent years of two dedicated funding streams for civil society – Ireland’s Civil Society Partnership for A Better World (ICSP), a funding scheme for 10 partners with significant capacity, and the Civil Society Fund, that supports smaller civil society organisations. IrishAid credits many of its successes to its close relationship with civil society, which both sides endeavour to foster.

Main trends

From 2017 onwards, there was a steady increase in Hungarian ODA, in line with the country’s development strategy, in which it committed to reach a 0.25% ODA/GNI ratio by 2025. In 2021, it seemed possible that the country would also fulfil its international commitment to the 0.33% ODA/GNI ratio. This trend was reversed in 2022 with a radical decline similar to the previous increase. In nominal terms, Hungarian ODA almost halved from EUR 316 million in 2022 to EUR 163 million in 2024, and the ODA/GNI ratio fell from 0.26% to 0.09%, the rate achieved in the first half of the 2010s. This is despite a visible change in the government’s approach to the role of international development after 2017. Efforts to help persecuted Christians and to prevent migration have moved international development up the priority list in Hungarian foreign policy, as indicated by the adoption of the 2020-25 strategy. The COVID epidemic, the Russian-Ukrainian war and inflation, which has hit Hungary particularly hard, seem to have overridden ambitious commitments. If anything, unpredictability is the most constant feature of Hungarian international development, though it would be surprising in the coming years if the trend were to reverse and Hungarian ODA were to reach the 2020-21 highs again. There may be year-to-year variations and shifting trends in ODA levels, but the fluctuating performance of Hungarian ODA is mainly a reflection of a lack of clear vision and consistent long-term goals.

Government’s relationship with civil society

Over the past 20 years, the Hungarian government’s relationship with civil society in the field of international development has been inconsistent and marked by varying levels of openness. There were periods when CSOs were invited to consultations and project implementation, followed by years of disengagement, lack of transparency and minimal support. Key strategic documents and decisions were often made without meaningful civil society input, and financial support for CSOs has been irregular and unpredictable. While there have been positive steps in recent years–such as re-introducing open calls for proposals for CSOs or invitations to events and one-off consultations–these were not embedded in a long-term cooperation framework, thus government–CSO relations reflect a pattern of sporadic engagement rather than sustained partnership. Ultimately the absence of structured dialogue or co-creation mechanisms with other stakeholders continues to limit the effectiveness of Hungary’s development cooperation.

Main trends

In 2024, Germany’s development cooperation faced another year of significant cuts. The federal government reduced humanitarian aid by EUR 400 million (–18%) and cut EUR 1 billion (–8%) from the BMZ’s development budget. Political instability further exacerbated the situation: in autumn 2024, the governing coalition collapsed, triggering snap elections and delaying key decisions on development financing into 2025. During the campaign, several politicians advocated for merging the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) with the Foreign Office. However, strong pushback from civil society contributed to the new Conservative–Social Democrat government retaining a standalone development ministry.

Despite this, the downward trend in funding continues. The BMZ is set to lose another EUR 1 billion in 2025 – the third consecutive year of such cuts – with a further reduction of EUR 1 billion planned by 2028. Humanitarian aid is also under threat, with the initial 2025 budget proposal suggesting a drastic cut of over 50%. Moreover, Germany tends to fall short of its pledge to provide EUR 6 billion annually in international climate finance. Despite these drastic cuts, Germany is on the path to become (for the first time in history) the largest international ODA contributor, because of the dismantling of USAID by the Trump administration.

Germany’s new Development Minister, Reem Alabali-Radovan, is under pressure to present a strategic reorientation of Germany’s development policy and has announced four priorities: ensuring a life in dignity, linking development with security and foreign policy, leveraging the private sector, and building strategic alliances. Whether these ambitions can be implemented in a context of shrinking budgets remains to be seen.

Government’s relationship with civil society

In 2024, the BMZ adopted a new strategy for engaging with civil society, offering encouraging signals for innovation and deeper collaboration. The strategy seeks to strengthen political dialogue, defend civic space globally, promote feminist development policy, empower Global South actors, and simplify funding procedures for CSOs.

However, funding cuts have taken a toll on implementation. The number of newly approved civil society projects has dropped by around 30%. This decline puts additional pressure on many partner organisations, some of which were already struggling due to funding gaps left by the termination of key USAID programmes. Despite a strong strategic framework, the shrinking resources are limiting civil society’s ability to act.

Main trends

In France, ODA is characterised by a high share of loans (21% in 2024). Recent years have seen a surge of private sector instruments and a slight reduction of in-donor refugee costs. However, ODA directed to LDCs has yet to reach anticipated levels, remaining below 20% of bilateral aid.

From the 2000s until 2017, France’s ODA remained relatively stagnant. This changed when the government promoted international solidarity as a strategic priority, resulting in a 60% increase in total ODA between 2016 and 2022. In 2021, the French Parliament passed a national programming law that set financial targets, reaffirmed the 0.7% GNI target and defined key policy and geographic priorities .

In recent years, France stepped up its support for high-priority policies, endorsing ministerial strategies on humanitarian action, civil society engagement, youth initiatives and human rights. ODA allocated to and through CSOs tripled between 2016 and 2023. Since 2009, the French Development Agency (AFD) has also backed CSOs’ right to initiative via a dedicated, flexible funding mechanism. In 2019, France launched a feminist foreign policy and established a fund to support grassroots feminist organisations. Despite these strong commitments, France reversed course starting in 2024, initiating significant cuts to its ODA budget: EUR 742 million in 2024, followed by EUR 2.3 billion in 2025. As a result, total ODA as a share of GNI dropped from 0.56% in 2022 to 0.48% in 2024. An additional cut of EUR 700 million is projected for 2026, effectively reducing the ODA budget to below the 2017 level.

A substantial portion of ODA (7.7% in 2024) continues to be allocated to in-donor refugee costs. Meanwhile, the government’s growing emphasis on domestic priorities, including economic, security and diplomatic interests, has raised concerns about the potential instrumentalisation of ODA.

Government’s relationship with civil society

Over the past two decades, the French Government’s relationship with civil society has significantly improved, driven by greater recognition of CSO’s important roles. This recognition is now embedded in legislation and a dedicated ministerial strategy. The government has also established support mechanisms and increased funding to and through CSOs between 2017 and 2023.France acknowledges CSO’s right to take independent initiatives, supporting this through a dedicated funding instrument managed by the AFD. This relationship has enabled CSOs to contribute meaningfully to policymaking and national strategies–such as the ministerial strategy on civil society and the feminist foreign policy.

Despite progress, new regulations have tightened state control over CSOs, notably through mandatory compliance with broad and ambiguously defined “republican principles,” as well as the disproportionate application of Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) rules, imposing a mandatory screening of beneficiaries.
Finally, the instrumentalisation of aid reached a peak in 2022 and 2023, when France suspended ODA to Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali. This decision had severe repercussions for affected communities and significantly disrupted CSO operations in the region.

Main trends

In 2024, Estonia’s development cooperation remained strongly influenced by geopolitical realities, especially Russia’s war against Ukraine. Over 72% of Estonia’s bilateral development aid allocated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was directed to Ukraine. This reflects both solidarity and a long-term commitment to reconstruction and democratic resilience. The trend from recent years continued, with projects focusing on education, governance and economic recovery. The Eastern Partnership continues to be the main regional focus, with ongoing engagement in Moldova and renewed activity in Armenia. However, political instability led to the suspension of bilateral cooperation with Georgia. In Africa, Estonia maintained its focus on four priority countries: Kenya, Uganda, Botswana and Namibia and aligned cooperation with its strengths in digitalisation, education and entrepreneurship. In 2024, ESTDEV launched a new digital and green transition stream in the region, supported by EUR 1.5 million of EU funding. While Ukraine remained the political and financial priority, there was a shift in Africa toward fewer but more strategic projects. Limited domestic funding, however, continued to constrain broader involvement of civil society.

Compared to earlier years, Estonia’s ODA strategy has become more centralised, professional and politically guided, especially since ESTDEV was established in 2021. The new implementation plan for 2024 to 2026 reflects a more structured and results-oriented approach. At the same time, total ODA volume decreased compared to 2023, mainly due to lower in-donor refugee cost reporting.

Looking ahead, Estonia’s development policy is expected to remain focused on Ukraine and the EU neighbourhood while gradually expanding global engagement. Core drivers such as security, values-based diplomacy and digital expertise remain unchanged, but are now pursued with greater coordination and strategic leverage than 20 years ago.

Government’s relationship with civil society

In 2024, the relationship between CSOs and the Estonian government in development cooperation remained generally stable, with no major changes compared to previous years. CSOs continue to engage constructively with Ministry of Foreign Affairs and ESTDEV representatives and actively participate in consultations on strategic documents like the Development Cooperation Implementation Plan.

At the same time, some CSOs have expressed concerns about the increasing focus on business diplomacy and public-private partnerships (PPP), noting that this shift may affect the intended priorities of development cooperation. CSOs therefore advocate a careful balance between economic interests and development goals. Additionally, CSOs have highlighted the importance of ongoing dialogue and transparency around funding allocation and management within ESTDEV. Clearer communication about resource distribution would further strengthen trust and enable more strategic collaboration. Overall, while the cooperation with governmental stakeholders remains positive and collaborative, these reflections suggest areas where openness and clarity could be enhanced to support even better partnership going forward.

Main trends

Huge cuts in ODA. The current government was formed in 2023 by the coalition of centre-right and populist parties. The political attitude towards development cooperation is characterised by:

• The main political “glue” for the current government is balancing the national budget and cutting the national debt.
• The populist-right party, the Finns Party, has been actively suspicious towards development cooperation and suggests ending it.
• The Finns Party is responsible for development policy as well as for the state budget.
• Development policy is not a priority of any party in the current government.

This has resulted in ODA cuts of around 25% during the current governmental term. The ODA/GNI ratio is going to drop to below 0.36% (government estimation) in 2025. In comparison, the ODA/GNI ratio in 2023 was 0.52%. The result is a reduction in the support to LDCs. Finland is, in theory, committed to the amount of 0.2 % of GNI to ODA for the LDC countries, but no longer declares this amount in the national budget. In policy wise, this translates into an almost total lack of LDC visibility in the Report on International Economic Relations and Development Cooperation (2024). Another consequence is the deprioritisation of sustainable development. There are no mentions of sustainable development in the Governmental Programme and the government is consistent on this: sustainable development is not a central theme in the funding and policies.

Government’s relationship with civil society

The relationship between the Finnish government and civil society is mixed.
On the positive side:

• The government has declared that civil society is a focus for Finnish development policy and that Finnish NGOs are a key partner for the government. This is seen in funding as almost every other dimension of the ODA has cut, but support for most NGOs has not.
• Fingo was invited by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to participate in the OECD DAC peer review process as an observer. Fingo’s participation was an example of good relations with the civil society and Fingo was able to contribute fully by submitting a report and other materials, and by being present in the whole process. In the end Fingo was thanked by many official members in the peer review team for providing essential information and being a valuable asset to the process. (OECD Development Cooperation Peer Reviews FINLAND 2024).

On the negative side:

• The government ended two kinds of grants: the support for peace promotion, and support for global citizenship education. The reasons seem to be ideological because there could have been money for these grants.
• Many in the NGO sector perceive the participation of civil society in policy processes as more limited than before. Fingo, as a part of the OECD DAC peer review process, found that the opportunities for participation have been reduced under the current government.

Main trends

Denmark has an ongoing commitment to reaching the 0.7% target of GNI. In 2024, Danish ODA reached a remarkably high level, increasing by DKK 2,870.90 million (EUR 384.50 million) compared to 2023, resulting in a total of DKK 23,988.7 million (EUR 3.21 billion). However, this is not a result of heightened ambition but due to a failure in meeting the 0.7 % target in 2022 and an unpredicted rise in GNI resulting in high regulatory compensation.

In 2024, Danish ODA had four priorities: 1) climate diplomacy and green development cooperation; 2) Africa and equal partnerships with global south partners; 3) Ukraine and neighbour countries and; 4) irregular migration. These express the recent trends in Danish ODA of increased focus on global climate action, linking ODA to migration, and a geographical focus on Africa and EU neighbour countries, particularly Ukraine. In 2024 a new spending target of 35% on green initiatives and climate change was introduced, increasing from 30% in 2023.

In 2024, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, was also named Minister of Development, signalling the increased integration of development policy and foreign affairs, trade and security policy. This trend is also apparent in the new Development Policy Strategy launched in June 2025. The strategy holds onto core development priorities such as collaboration with civil society, localisation and human rights. However, it also stresses the importance of linking development cooperation to economic diplomacy and using aid to mobilise private funds, which has been facilitated by the re-launch of the Danish development finance institution as Impact Fund Denmark.

The increased integration of development policy with other policy areas, emphasis on leveraging private sector funds and allocating ODA to climate action have led to civil society calls for continued focus on allocating ODA to poverty eradication and to LDCs.

Government’s relationship with civil society

Denmark has a strong tradition of consulting stakeholders, including civil society, in policy processes both at the political level and with relevant government officials. This is the case both now and in the past. While there is always room for improvement, there is generally good collaboration between the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and CSOs, with the Ministry inviting civil society partners to meetings on relevant political processes and events.

An example from 2024 is the development of a Danish plan for increased cooperation with Africa. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs invited civil society to input, resulting in a policy paper with recommendations building on four round table conversations with civil society actors from Denmark and Africa and employees from the Ministry. The new development policy strategy from June 2025 includes different types of consultations such as written, roundtables and conferences with civil society and other stakeholders.

Main trends

Czechia’s ODA dropped from 0.24 % in 2023, to 0.17 % of GNI in 2024, according to preliminary OECD DAC figures (still above its long-term average of 0.13%). After subtracting the in-donor refugee spending on Ukrainian refugees, the ODA figure further decreased to 0.11 %. The long-term weak performance with respect to the genuine level of ODA was also addressed by the OECD DAC Peer Review of Czech ODA in 2023. Despite this, the Ministry of Finance is considering severe cuts to annual bilateral ODA plans. With elections in October 2025, the future of meaningful ODA financing remains uncertain.

The capacity of the Czech authorities to focus on development cooperation and humanitarian aid is very limited and in 2024 they continued to be significantly impacted by the humanitarian and stabilisation assistance to Ukraine. Czechia succeeded in obtaining EUR 188 million for activities under the EU Ukraine Facility. The real driver here was Ministry of Finance, which seems somewhat reluctant to promote other development cooperation.

In spite of this, there have been positive moves toward integrating the humanitarian–development nexus and Disaster Risk Reduction approaches into humanitarian action The Czech Development Agency is also increasingly active in EU delegated cooperation.

The long-term positive aspect of Czech ODA is that it supports initiatives that promote democratic governance, the rule of law, and human rights in partner countries. This includes providing assistance for electoral processes, strengthening legal systems, and supporting civil society organisations. Development programmes increasingly focus on promoting social inclusion, with a particular emphasis on gender equality, the rights of marginalised groups, and the empowerment of women and youth.

Government’s relationship with civil society

The relationship between governmental stakeholders and CSOs is generally cooperative, though it can vary based on specific issues and political contexts. The government often collaborates, or at least provides space for consultations, with CSOs in developing and implementing policies, particularly in areas where these organisations have expertise and/or act as implementers, such as social services, human rights, environmental agendas, education, humanitarian and development assistance. On the other hand, the political context remains extremely fragile and this positive relationship cannot be considered as a given also for the years to come.

Main trends

Croatia has increased its ODA in 2024 to 0.21% of GNI, in comparison to 0.2% in 2023. This represents a continuation of the existing trend from the past several years of gradual increases in ODA disbursements. Croatia still needs to devise a strategic policy framework with clearly defined ODA priorities. Croatia became an OECD candidate country in 2022, with the expectation of accession in 2026, which could potentially serve as an impetus to intensify its efforts in the field in preparation to becoming a full member of the OECD DAC.

Although Croatia adopted the Act on International Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid in 2024, the national development cooperation strategy has not yet been developed, which means there is still a policy vacuum following the expiration of the previous strategy in 2021.

Government’s relationship with civil society

The Act on International Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid adopted in February 2024 aims to enable more dynamic cooperation with development stakeholders that were not included in the implementation of the current Act, in particular CSOs and the private sector. It also specifically lists CSOs as both actors who undertake development cooperation and through whom development projects can be financed. CROSOL has been included in the multistakeholder committee for international development cooperation and humanitarian aid and has been invited to provide its inputs during the process of drafting the new law.

Main trends

Belgian development cooperation has long been recognised for its strong focus on Fragile and Conflict-Affected States (FCS) and LDCS, particularly in Africa. With a clear emphasis on poverty reduction and inequality, Belgium has consistently invested in sectors such as health, education and food security. Its rights-based approach prioritises democracy, human rights, and good governance–especially through support to civil society and local institutions. Belgium is also a firm advocate of multilateralism. All these priorities and principles–including the commitment to the 0.7% target and the principle of Policy Coherence for Development (PCD)–are enshrined in Belgium’s development cooperation law. Through diverse partnerships with NGOs, multilateral actors, academia and the private sector–and with a strong focus on grants–Belgian ODA has, over the past 20 years, made a meaningful contribution to international solidarity, addressing global challenges that markets cannot deliver and military solutions cannot resolve.

Yet today, this legacy is under pressure. In early 2025, the new government decided to cut development cooperation by 25%. If this path continues, Belgium may dedicate as little as 0.3% of its GNI to ODA by 2029. At the same time, like many other European countries, Belgium is prioritising large-scale defence spending as essential for national security.

While humanitarian aid is spared and even elevated as a core focus, structural development efforts risk being deprioritised. A more transactional approach is gaining ground, where cooperation is increasingly expected to align with Belgian political or economic interests. This instrumentalisation risks undermining the principles of solidarity and effectiveness that have long defined Belgian development cooperation. It also underscores the urgent need to improve PCD, legally anchored in Belgium but largely absent from current political discourse.

Government’s relationship with civil society

The role of civil society is explicitly acknowledged in the new government’s coalition agreement and is seen as complementary to other development channels. The minister of development cooperation has also emphasised the importance of an open civic space. At the same time, significant budget cuts are foreseen for CSOs (25%), alongside a push for geographical and thematic concentration.

So far, the dialogue with civil society has largely focused on its own role, with limited attention to a broader reflection on the future and positioning of Belgian development cooperation in today’s turbulent geopolitical context. As civil society actors, we expect the minister to continue defending development cooperation as a policy tool aimed at reducing poverty and inequality. We also hope he will publicly reaffirm the crucial role of civil society–not only as an implementing partner, but as a vital pillar of a healthy democracy all over the world. Within the current coalition, there are divergent views on this matter. This makes it all the more important that the minister provides clear leadership on these fundamental principles

Main trends in 2022

Austria’s ODA fell to 0.34% in 2024, from 0.38% in 2023, which is still far below the longstanding 0.7% international target and the 0.2% commitment to LDCs. The reduction in ODA in 2024 is largely due to decreased multilateral funds supporting Ukraine, and lower in-donor refugee costs which continue to inflate ODA figures. Humanitarian assistance also dropped after record highs in 2023, reversing earlier progress as funding from the Foreign Disaster Relief Fund (AKF) increased significantly until 2022, but has since been reduced, weakening Austria’s reliability as a humanitarian partner.

Over the past 20 years, Austria’s ODA has consistently hovered around half the promised level, rarely exceeding 0.4% of GNI. The newly adopted Three Year Programme (3YP) on development policy aspires to bring qualitative improvements, but its impact depends on effective implementation and sufficient funding. However, prospects for substantive change are remote: the newly formed government has announced ODA budget cuts by almost one quarter in 2025 and 2026 (compared with 2024 figures).

Key funding priorities of Austria’s ODA remain largely unchanged, driven more by geopolitical and domestic interests than recipient needs, as shown by the limited presence of LDCs and African countries among the top recipients. While there has been important progress in recent years, such as the adoption of the Humanitarian Aid Strategy and the integration of gender equality in Austrian Development Cooperation, implementation gaps, inconsistent funding, and lack of strategic policy coherence continue to undermine these commitments.

Government’s relationship with civil society

Austria has a longstanding tradition of supporting CSOs in development cooperation and humanitarian assistance, anchored in its development cooperation law and implemented primarily through the Austrian Development Agency’s (ADA) bilateral funding programmes. However, overall funding levels for CSOs–both within Austria and for partners abroad–remain comparatively low. Despite the newly formed government signalling increased political will for development and humanitarian policy, this momentum has reversed in practice: budget cuts planned for 2025 and 2026 impact bilateral funding from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and ADA, which will directly reduce support for Austrian and local CSOs. These reductions threaten to further shrink Austria’s contribution to civil society and restrict the operating space for NGOs, undermining the consistent backing historically offered through its legal and funding frameworks.